1. For more than a decade, the public has been told that the path to a clean, cheap, and secure energy system is mainly a matter of political will: build more wind, build more solar, add batteries, and upgrade the grid as we go. That story assumes the network can always be made to “catch up” later. Across Europe, that assumption is now failing. Grid backlogs and connection delays are increasingly recognised as the limiting factor for renewables deployment , not the ability to win consent or pour concrete.¹

2. Greece is now an uncomfortably clear warning of what happens when generation grows faster than the network can absorb and move it. According to Greek solar producers’ representatives, Greece curtailed about 1.85 TWh of renewable electricity in 2025, with curtailment rising sharply versus the previous year and with fears of much larger volumes ahead.²

3. The timing of the curtailment matters, because it exposes the structural mismatch. Greek industry voices have said the biggest share of curtailment corresponds to solar because curtailments occur predominantly from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. — precisely when solar output is strongest.² This is not a “weather problem” or a “demand problem”. It is a grid problem: power arriving in bulk, in the wrong places, at the wrong times, with insufficient network capacity to move it to where it is needed.

4. Greece has also been explicit that storage is being positioned as a curtailment-management tool. In reporting on the Greek market, ESS News quoted industry discussion around the scale of storage Greece would need to keep curtailment within tolerable limits.³ Whether one accepts the exact number or not, the underlying admission is what matters: curtailment is no longer an edge-case ,  it is becoming a routine system condition.

5. In theory, Greece has already acted. The country ran three battery storage tenders/auctions across 2023–2025, awarding standalone, front-of-the-meter storage capacity in tranches. PV Magazine summarised the outcome as permits for roughly 900 MW across the three rounds ,  yet with no projects connected to the grid at the time of reporting.⁴

6. The most revealing detail is that this is no longer just “delay on paper”. ESS News reported that around 300 MW of the awarded projects have been installed but are still waiting for grid connection ,  in other words, built assets sitting idle because the system cannot plug them in.³ This is what the grid wall looks like in practice: infrastructure exists, investment is spent, but deliverability fails at the point of connection.

7. Greece is simultaneously trying to expand its storage pipeline further via a separate programme. PV Magazine reported on Greece launching a 4.7 GW utility-scale, standalone storage programme designed to provide priority connection and operate on a merchant basis (without subsidy support).⁵ That policy design is an implicit acknowledgement that the system is now scrambling to procure flexibility at scale ,  and fast.

8. But the Greek experience exposes a misconception at the heart of modern energy policy: you cannot fix a grid that cannot move power by simply adding more equipment that also depends on the same constrained grid. Batteries do not create transmission capacity. They do not decongest saturated substations. They do not remove geographic mismatch. At best, they delay curtailment until the batteries fill, at which point curtailment resumes.

9. Greece’s storage delays also reflect a broader market pathology: “auction success” does not equal delivery. PV Magazine’s reporting (drawing on industry comments) and ESS News both point to uncertainty and dysfunction in the investment-to-connection chain.³⁴ And as broader European grid operators and investors increasingly acknowledge, long queues and speculative capacity reservations distort deployment , leaving serious projects stuck behind paperwork and bottlenecks.¹

10. The United Kingdom is travelling the same road. The grid queue has been described publicly as clogged with “zombie” applications, with projects facing long waits for connection while system reforms attempt to prioritise readiness and strategic alignment. Reuters reported NESO pausing new connection applications in early 2025 to implement reforms aimed at dealing with the backlog.⁶

11. NESO itself has published “Connections Reform” material setting out the Gate 1 / Gate 2 structure and the intent to move from a first-come approach toward a readiness/strategic model, precisely because the existing queue process has become incompatible with deliverability.⁷ In its published Connections Reform documentation, NESO has also illustrated the reality of connection dates extending into the mid-2030s under certain queue assumptions.⁸

12. This is why “approved capacity” is increasingly misleading as a measure of energy security. A megawatt that cannot be connected is not energy; it is a spreadsheet entry. The system can claim progress through consents, auctions, and targets , while the physical network quietly sets the real limit.

13. At this point, the strategic options narrow. Either the pace of new generation deployment slows until the network catches up, or the country embarks on genuine reindustrialisation of grid construction (a multi-year, often multi-decade undertaking), or policy pivots toward dense, dispatchable supply that reduces reliance on sprawling, congestion-prone build-out.

14. Greece is showing what the near-future looks like when the grid wall is reached: curtailment surges, storage is procured in theory but stuck in practice, and officials are forced into ever-larger programmes just to stop the system wasting its own output. The UK is not immune; it is simply later in the same cycle. We have hit the grid wall.

Shane Oxer.   Campaigner for fairer and affordable energy

Footnotes
1.Financial Times report on Europe’s renewables push being slowed by grid connection waits and broader grid bottlenecks across EU markets. �
2.Financial Times
PV Magazine (Dec 18, 2025) quoting POSPIEF / Petros Tsikouras: Greece curtailed about 1.85 TWh of renewables in 2025; curtailment largely solar; mainly 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.; claims of rapid growth vs prior years. �
3.pv magazine International
ESS News report (Jan 2, 2026) stating Greece ran three auctions for about 900 MW, with no projects connected, and around 300 MW installed awaiting electrification/connection; also includes investor commentary about delays and market structure. �
4.Energy Storage
PV Magazine (Jan 5, 2026) summarising the three auctions (2023–2025), ~900 MW awarded, and noting no projects connected at the time of reporting. �
pv magazine International
5.PV Magazine (Mar 18, 2025) on Greece launching a 4.7 GW utility-scale standalone storage programme with priority connection and merchant operation. �
6.pv magazine International
Reuters report (Jan 15, 2025) on NESO pausing new grid connection applications to implement reforms due to backlog/queue issues. �
7.Reuters
NESO “About Connections Reform” page describing Gate 2 requirements and the intent to confirm connection dates for projects meeting readiness/strategic alignment. �
8.National Energy System Operator (NESO)
NESO “Great Britain’s Connections Reform: Overview Document” (PDF) including discussion/illustration of readiness-based queue outcomes with connection dates extending to 2035 (and references to dates beyond under certain queue assumptions). �